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The Belgian Case:
Phenix or How to Design E-justice
Thro'ugh Privacy Requirements and
in Full Respect of the Separation of Powers
Yves Poullet
University of Namul; Belgium
ABSTRACT
This chapter exami~S the ambitious Phenix project, a global project for the whole computerization
of ail Courts and Tr bunals in Belgium, with the use of ICT by ail stakeholders. It focuses especially
on the legislative masures that have been taken, mainly in relation to data protection and legal
value of the docum nts generated by the use of the electronic procedure.
INTRODUCTION forth. ln other words, Phenix is a global project
for the whole computerization of ail courts and
tribunals in Belgium. Since the introduction of
the dossier until its notification, Phenix aimed
to have the actors involved in these different
phases: the lawyers, the magistrates, the reg-
Phenix is the brand n~ me of a project which aims
to introduce ICT at Il the steps of the judicial
procedure in Belgiu , no matter the affair en-
gaged in: criminal,' civil, commercial, and so
Copyright <C> 2009, IGI Glo~aI. distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
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the different levels; and (3) the idea that such a
centralized projectwill diminish atmidterm the
costs of the functioning of the tribunals. Several
technical working groups6 have been settled up
in order to elaborate and formulate the needed
recommendations to address to the legislator,
to the fumisher chosen, and definitively to the
different actors involved by this revolution. The
first concrete works have started in 2002; two
acts have been promulgated in order to fix the
legal context of the Phenix project, and no legs
than 18 royal decrees have to be drafted.
Notwithstanding aIl the efforts of aIl the
actors and the budget afforded to ensure the
success of the project, recently in March 2007,
the present Ministry of Justice has announced
the Phenix project's failure and the obligation to
stop the works initiated.ltseems thatthis failure
is due to the difficulties met by the supplier to
solve complex technical problems. A litigation
is in course before a Belgian court between the
state and its furnisher. The next government,
which will beformed afterthe nextelections in
June, will have to decide which foIlow-up will
be given to the project. From this bad Belgian
experience, a first conclusion must be drawn:
even ifwe need to have a global project in order
to structure aIl thedevelopments, it isabsolutely
needed to start with local and dedicated experi-
ences in order to learn apart from these partial
experiences how to adapt continuously these
developments and to solve the concrete difficul-
ties met at any stages. Another benefit of this
experimental approach is also to progressively
convince aIl the stakeholders (the magistrates,
the registrars, the process servers, the lawyers,
and, finally, the citizens) of the benefits of the
project and to hear from them their expectations
about such a project. Too much reluctance has
been met from different groups, shocked by
this managerial revolution imposed without
real consultation.
istrars, the pu lic prosecutors, and the process
servers use t e technologies in a secure and
efficient way. This very ambitious project has
been approve by two legislative acts. The first
one, the "Phe ix Act," was enacted on August
10,2005.2 It i stitutes the information system
called "Pheni ," describes its mission, and sets
up different gans in order to regulate the sys-
tem. What is ore noticeable in that legislation
is the importa ce given by the legislatorto apply
and follow str ctly the data protection principles
in order to b ild up the Phenix Information
System. The econd act "relative to the judicial
procedure by electronic way" dates from July
10, 20063 an aims to modify certain provi-
sions into the ivil and Penal Procedural Code
in order to gi e legal value to the documents
generated by e use of the electronic procedure
settled up by the Phenix Information System.
Our short co tribution will analyze these two
facets ofthis egislative input.
Before sta ing, perhaps a few words about
the origin4 a d the present situation of the
Phenix Belgi n model would be needed. Apart
from 1990, ertain initiatives were taken ln
Belgium, but these initiatives were local and
not sufficientl coordinated. They were focusing
on the intern 1 use by tribunals of computers
and the devel pment of certain software aim-
ing to suppo the tribunal members' work. The
concept of a lobaI "e-justice" project has been
launched by t e previous government in 2000,
on the basis f the studies realized by a large
consortium,S oining together all the stakehold-
ers,andacall ortenderhas been issued in 2001.
Three main ncerns explain the launching of
a global and strongly centralized project: (1)
the develop ent of the Internet which creates
an opportun y but also an absolute need to
integrate the different databases; (2) the obli-
gation to av .d aIl the problems raised by the
incompatibil ty between the material used at
187
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PHENIX: AN ILLU TRATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE 'DESIGN BY
PRIVACY"7 AND BOUT THE
DIFFICULTY TO ESPECT THE
CONSITUTIONAL RINCIPLE
ABOUT THE SE~ RATION OF
POWERS
Article 2 of the 2005 ct setting up Phenix is
enunciated as follows: "Il est créé un système
d'information appelé henix qui a pour fi-
nalités la communica ion interne et externe
requise par le foncti nement de la Justice,
la gestion et la conse ation des dossiers ju-
diciaires, l'instauratio d'un rôle national, la
constitution d'une ba ue de données de juris-
prudence, l'élaboratio destatistiquesetl'aide
à la gestion et l'admin stration des institutions
judiciaires. "("It is se Led up an Information
system called Phenix, w ich has for purposes the
internai and external c mmunication requested
for the Justice needs, he setting up of a case
Law data base, the wor ing out of statistics and
the assistance to the m nagement and adminis-
tration of judicial instl utions 'jThis provision
and the precise enum ration of the different
purposes of the Pheni project is illustrative of
the importance given b the legislator to follow
strictly the first Privacy rinciple: aIl processing
must be created for legi imate, deterrninate, and
explicit purposes.8
The following prov.sions of the act are de-
scribing more precisely these different purposes
and implicitly are tixi g the recipients of the
different processing, t e data to be processed,
and the duration of the data storage, according
to the principle of prop rtionality: "Data might
be processed and kept nly ifthey are necessary
for the achievement 0 the legitimate purpose
of the processing."9 0 examples might be
given on that point. rticle 7 distinguishes
the court decisions da bases used for internaI
purposes and the court decisions databases dif-
fused publicly. As regards the second category,
the act imposes the dut Y to make anonymous
the decisions before any diffusion. What is
not asked as regards the first category insofar
is that the purpose of this second processing
ought to support the members of the jurisdic-
tion having issued the decision to "maintain a
consistency as regards its jurisprudence," as
explained by the Ministry of Justice. Another
example definitively is the use of certain data for
statistical purposes(art.l0and fi), which might
help internally to support decisions about the
management of the tribunals, but might never
be used for controlling the work achieved by
each judge individually.
This concern to follow the privacy require-
ments explains also the importance given to
the security of the different processing. This
obligation to have secure processing must
be the object of different royal decrees, and
certain norms might be imposed at that point.
This obligation raises certain problems. So, as
regards the access to the different fi les opened at
a court, it has been foreseen that the access will
be open to ail the members of the Bar Associa-
tion. The control of the identity and the quality
of the requester will be ensured as regards the
first point by the use of a secure authentication
and, as regards the second, by the fact that the
requester belongs to the lists held by the differ-
ent Bar Associations under the basis of his or
her national registration number. This checking
method has raised difficulties. Certain lawyers
have refused to give their national registration
number to the Bar Association and have raised
privacy concerns about the obligation to use
their electronic identity card as a unique way
ofauthentication, arguingthatthey would like
to d istinguish clearly the authentication method
they are using in the context of, from one part,
their professional activities and, from the other
part, as citizens.1o
Another more crucial problem was the con-
trol of the legitimate interest of the requester
188
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to have ac ess to the different files.11 Finally,
the system roposed was the possibility for the
lawyer in c arge of the file to know through the
login of ail e access to control a poj'teriori the
names oft e colleagues which have access to
the files. It s not obvious that fuis system will
be sufficien to avoid any abuse.
Other q estions about the application of the
data protec ion have to be mentioned. Particu-
larly, it has been pointed out that the right of
the data su 'ects must be respected by the data
controller. ata subjects are ofvarious natures:
definitively, .t concerns aIl the citizens which are
concerned b the litigation directly (the plaintiff
and the assi nee) but also indirectly (a person
quoted by t e judge, a witness), it might be also
the advocat s and the judges. So the question is:
to what exte t the present provision" included in
our civil or nal procedural codes enacting a
limited righ of access are complying with the
data protect on legislative requirements about
the right to e informed, the right to get access,
and the righ to correct or delete certain data?
This questi n is stiJl discussed.12
The mai problem met by the legislator
by setting the Phenix information system
surely was he choice of the different organs
to be install d in order to manage and to fuie
the develop ent of this information system.
Three maiq concerns have to be taken into
consideratio .The first one was to respect the
holy and co stitutional principle of the separa-
tion of pow rs, particularly the split between
the executiv power and the judicial one. The
second addr sses the delicate question of the
data protecti n and again the question of sepa-
ration of po ers between the legislative power
represented y the Data Protection Authority
(the Belgian ommission pour la protection de
la vie privée and the judicial one. How do we
ensure the c mpliance of the Phenix develop-
ment with t e data protection requirements?
Finally the t ird one is to ensure that the infor-
mation system meets the needs of the different
stakeholders involved.
To answer to these concerns, the Phenix
Act puts into place three organs: the "Man-
agement Committee" (Comité de gestion), the
"Surveillance Committee," and, finally, the
"Users' Committee." The main competence of
the first one is to ensure the daily management
ofPhenix and to take aIl initiatives which will
contribute to its efficiency. The committee has
therefore the possibility to decide on different
aspects like technical agreements, conformity
certificates as regards the legal value of certain
electronic documents, and to establish control
and security mechanisms.13 It proposes to the
Ministry the draft of the royal decrees needed
for the implementation of the legislative texts.
An annual report about the committee's activi-
ties must be established for the Highest Court
of Justice (Cour de cassation) and the Ministry
of Justice. Furthermore, the committee has to
intervene in case of technical deficiencies or
non respect of the Phenixrules. Thecommittee's
composition reflects the duality of nature of the
Phenix system belonging both to the executive
power and to the judicial one. Twelve members
nom inated by the King are composing the com-
mittee, 6 under proposaI by the judicial power,
and 6 under the proposaI of the Ministry of
Justice.
The "Surveillance Committee" is establ ished
by the Phenix Act as a sectoral Data Protection
Authority established within the Belgian Data
Protection Authority but having a lot of au-
tonomy and no subject to control by its mother
institution.14 Furthermore, the comm ittee exam-
ines the complaints introduced as regards the
nonrespectofthe data protection provisions and
might introduce any proposaIs about ail ques-
tions relative to privacy requirements applied to
the Phenix information system and its evolution.
The composition of this committee has been
subjecttoa lot ofd iscussion betweenthejudicial
power and the Data Protection Commission.15
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The judicial power i a tirst moment rejected
any form of interfer nce by the Data Protec-
tion Authority, acce ,ting only the presence
of a member of the ata Protection Authority
and only with consu tative voice. Finally, the
compromise propose by the government and
taken again by the ac was to have a committee
withsixmembers,th echosenbytheDPAand
the three others nom nated by the parliament
amongst the magistr es. The chairman neces-
sarily must be a mag strate.
The last organ to be put into place is the
"User's Committee,' in charge of proposing
to the Management ommittee any initiative
in order to promote t e Phenix use. The com-
mittee joins together 4 members representing
aIl the stakeholders ut with a huge majority
ofmagistrates (16/24 .It illustrates once again
the fear expressed d ing aIl the discussion by
the magistrates abo t the risk of losing their
independence in th same time information
systems were introd ced in their office..
PHENIX: HOW * GIVE LEGAL
VALUE TO ELE TRONIC
PROCEDURAL OCUMENTS16
The introduction of he electronic file defini-
tively is the major Te olution introduced by the
2006 Act relative to t e procedure by electronic
way. Three main pr nciples are asserted: the
first one is the freedo for everybody to choose
or not the electronic rocedure: "Sauf disposi-
tions légals contrair s, personne ne peut être
constraint de poser es actes de procédure ou
de recevoir des do ments relatifs à des actes
de procedure par oie électronique."l? This
consent's principlel8 i however allev iated by the
possibility to impos the use of the electronic
procedure to certai professions by royal de-
cree. ln order to ens Te the real consent of the
actors-to use the ele tronic procedure but also
the opposability of the electronic exchanges,
a list of the actors, professional or not, who
do accept the new tools to communicate in
the context of the procedure will be held and
published by the Ministry of Justice or by the
professional associations. The consent m ight be
withdrawn. Precisely the use of an electronic
judiciary address is left to the free choice of
the persons. The electronic address is defined
under Art. 6 of the 2006 Act, as : "l'adresse de
courier électronique, attribuée par un gr~ffe
et à laquelle une personne a accepté, selon
les modalités fixées par le Roi, que liui soient
adressées les significations, notifications et les
communications."
The second principle is the equivalency
principle. Under this principle, the electronic
address is equivalent to a physical address and
has the same permanency as the traditional one.
Furthermore, it must be considered that aIl the
electronic documents generated in the context of
the procedure are assimilated as regards its legal
value to a paper document and that electronic
signature in that context have the same legal
value than the traditional handwritten signature.
As Montero19 pinpointed, it must be clear that
under the 2006 Act, only advanced or under
the Belgian terminology qualified signatures
complying with the EU Directive requirements
are recognized in the context of the e-justice
system and not aIl electronic signatures2O in
order to ensure an easier legal security. Finally,
one pinpoints the principle of the unit y of the
electronic file insofar as the electronic nature of
the file; it is no more necessary to distinguish
copies and original, insofar this latter might be
reproduced in a nonlimited way.
As regards the relationships with the third
parties, essentially meaningthe lawyersand the
process servers, the idea is to authorize either
the downloading of the files or certain pieces
of the procedure either their access, through
the Judiciary order's portal, only after a double
190
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checking: first, the requester of the access needs
to be iden ified through a secure authentication;
second, t e system will seamlessly check near
the appro riate databases held by the profes-
sional ass iations, his or her quality. It is quite
obvioust atthe Phenix system will support ail
types of ocuments (open office, XML, PDF,
etc.). Fin ly, the act contains certain provi-
sions abo t the consequences of a not guilty21
dysfuncti n of the information system (virus,
breakdow of the information system, etc.)
which are ssimilated22 to Acts of God "when
that dysfu ctioning hinders the exercise of the
citizen's ri hts." Let us DOW have a look at the
different seps of the procedure.
The in roduction of a litigation before a
court (la ise au rôle) would have to be, apart
from now, ealized by an electronic message}3
On that po nt, it might be remembered that the
role is hel through electronic means publicly
accessible, but any access is registered in order
to avoid a ses as regards the privacy protec-
tion requir ments}4 The registrar automatically
attributes the affair a specific identifying
number w ich will follow the case during its
entire judio all.ife (including in appeal or before
the highest. Court of Justice). This identifying
number co tains neither the name of the par-
ties, nor ot er personal data. The registrar is in
charge of aking the inventories of the files.
Certain no s as regards the preservation of
the integrit of the pieces notwithstanding the
change into the technology must be defined.
As regar s DOW the management of the file,
the Phenix 1 forrpation system will receivethe
additional e ements appropriate to each step of
the judicial procedure: "Toute autre commu-
nication pa pli simple ou recommandé peut
avoir lieu lablement par voie électronique
ou par intro uction dans le système Phenix."25
The article of the 2006 Act determines the
moment oft e delivery of the electronic docu-
ment as foll ws: "la délivrance d'un document
électronique est le moment où le destinataire
peut prendre connaissance du contenu de celui-
ci" ln order to avoid any litigation as regards
this moment, it ts possible to make recourse to
a third party. ln that case, the moment of the
delivery is fixed by the statement given by this
third party certifying the delivery of the mes-
sage to the recipient.
The fixation of the audience must also be
done through electronic messages. The judg-
ment will be issued and signed electronically
by the judge before it is sent to the database,
the internaI one, and after having been duly
made anonymous by the Registrar, the publicly
accessible one.
Two peculiar operations must be analyzed
additionally, the "signification" and the "notifi-
cation." Both operations are aimingto makethe
citizen or his/her lawyer aware of the existence
of the pursuit or of the judgment. For ensuring
the se two operations, the use of an electronic
message is possible26 through the interven-
tion of a trusted third party who will have to
ensure that the document has been delivered
without modification (certificate of integrity)
to the electronic address of the addressee and
that this delivery has taken place at a precise
moment (time stamping). For achieving it, the
2006 Act foresees the intervention of a "com-
munication service provider"27 who will certify
the delivery and the moment ofthis delivery}8
To be complete, it must be noted that the legis-
lation puts in place a hybrid system in case the
final recipient has no electronic address. ln that
case, the service communication provider will
make a copy on a paper certified conform of
the message and deliver it to the process server





CONCLUSION As regards the modifications introduced by
the legislator into the civil procedural code, we
might subscribe to the main principles asserted
through the multiple provisions: the consent
permits to avoid any risk of discrimination
between those who adopt the new electronic
system and the others more reluctant to it. The
"functional equivalency" principle has permit-
ted to introduce concept like electron ic address,
electronic file, electronic signature, electronic
signification, and notification. By doing that
and by proposing a real secure communication
system with the intervention of trusted third
parties, control of access, double checking,
and so forth, the Belgian legislator proposes to
the other European legislator a really attractive
model.
Isthere a BelgianPh nixmodel?lnmyopinion,
it would be too eas to simply answer by the
negative, invoking epresentfailure of the Phe-
nix launching. It is bvious that the promoters
have been too ambi jOUg and, perhaps, a more
progressive approac associated with the actors,
especially magistra s, registrars, and lawyers,
step by step, worki g on specific domain and
using pilot experien es would have been better.
Notwithstanding th. se facts, one wou Id like to
underline the qualit es of the legal framework
put into place to ens re e-justice, which might
be in my opinion vie ed as a model for foreign
countries. 80 we mig t consider that the Belgian
legislator, even if th solutions are not always
perfect, has designe a privacy compliant sys-
tem and that, throug the organs settled up, the
independence of the judiciary power vis-à-vis
the executive power is safeguarded.
REFERENCES
FUTURE TREN~S
Two points have to considered as crucial in
the future. First, sin e through a global infor-
mation systems at th bands of the magistrates
their informational p wer is increasing by their
possibility to cross a ertain number ofinforma-
tion about the partie it must be feared that the
principle of the "equa ity of the weapons" would
not be respected. ln t atrespect, data protection
requirements are im ortant. At the same time,
the fact that the info ation system is operated
and sometimes devel ped by the administration
put at risk in the Ion term a progressive loss
of the independence fthejudges. The solution
proposed by the Bel ian legislation is in that
perspective notice w rthy even if they appear
a bit intricate and to complex as regards the
day to day managem nt.
Burton, C., & Poullet, Y. (2005). A propos de
l'avis n09/2005 de la Commission de protection
de la vie privée du 15 juin 2005 sur l'encadrement
des listes noires. RTDI, 23, 100 and ff.
Colson, B., Montero, E., & Mougenot, D. (2007).
Phenix -les tribunaux a' l'e're électronique:
Actes du co/loque du 8 Février 200~ Cahiers
du Centre de recherches informatique et droit,
29. Namur: Crid, Facultés universitaires Notre-
Dame de la Paix de Namur.
Danieli, F. (2006). L'application de la loi vie
privée au pouvoir judiciaire et au secteur
policier: Disaster or much ado about nothing.
RDTI,25, 169-203.
Henrotte, J. F. (Ed.). (2005). Phenix et la procé-
dure électronique. Bruxelles: Larcier.
Henrotte,J. F., & Poullet, Y. (Ed.). (2005). Cabi-





Hubin, J., 2005). Les relations Barreau-Palais:
la diffusi n des données jurisprudentielles
dans le dre du programme« Phénix»
d'informa isation de l'ordre judiciaire. ln J. F.
Henrotte Y.Poullet(Eds.),Cabinetsd'avocats
et techno gies de l'information. Bruxelles:
Bruylant.
Lamberts~v. (2007). La signification par voie
électroniq e. ln B. Colson et al. (Eds.), Phenix:
les tribun ux à l'ère de l'électronique. Brux-
elles: Bru lant.
Montero, .(2007). Signature et preuve des
envois dan le cadre des corn rnunications judi-
ciaires éle roniques. ln B. Colson et al. (Eds.),
Phenix: les ibunaux à l'ère de l'électronique.
Bruxelles: ruylant. 4
S
MOUgenot,t o. (2007). Le code judiciaire à
l'épreuve d cyberspace: une réforme réussie.
ln B. Colso et al. (Eds.), Phenix: les tribunaux
à l'ère de 1 électronique. Bruxelles: Bruylant.
Poullet, Y., f Moreau, D. (2006). La justice au
risque de la vie privée. ln J. F. Henrotte (Ed.),
Phenix et la rocédure électronique. Bruxelles:
Larcier.
vandermeeI ch D. (2007). Phen ix à l'épreuve de
la procedur pénale. ln B. Colson et al. (Eds.),
Phenix: les ibunaux à l'ère de l'électronique.
Bruxelles: ruylant.
Phenix, M.B., 1er septembre 2005, p.
38.305).
As regards this second act and its analysis,
see the various contributions published
in Colson et al. (2007). No Jess than 24
royal decrees were foreseen as regards
the implementation of both acts. Some of
them have been already drafted but not yet
submitted to the royal signature. This Act
has been published at the Belgian OfficiaI
Journal (Moniteur Belge) (Loi du 10 juil-
let 2006 relative à la procédure par voie
électronique et du 5 août 2006 modifiant
certaines dispositions du codejudiciare en
vue de la procédure par voie électronique,
M.B., 7 septmebre 20006, p. 45517).
About this genesis, see Hubin (2005).
The consortium "e-Justice" has been cre-
ated by the Ministry of Justice in 2002
and 2003 under the direction of three
university prof essors: G.de LevaI (ULG),
P. Taelman (U. Gent), and Y. Poullet (U.
Namur). It has worked during 18 months
and produced reports which have been
taken as points of reference by the authors
of the project, put under the leadership of
President Verougstraete. First, president of
the Cour de Cassation (the highest Belgian
Court of Justice). About these works, the
reports published at the CRID's Web site:
http://www. crid.be
Il technical groups have been therefore
created. The most important was the
Juricontrol W.G. in charge to formulate
the legislative provisions about the Phe-
nix system. Others groups have also to
be quoted: "Security," "Modelisation,"
"Change Management," "Communica-
tion," "Nomenclatures and Codes," "Legal
value of electronic judicial documents,"
"Archives," "Infrastructure," "Software
Applications," and "External relation-
ships with process servers, lawyers, and
so forth."
ENDNOT~S
The s ific legislative provisions about he
crimin 1 procedure will not be commented
in the resent contribution. About these
provisi ns, read Vandermeersch (2007).
As reg ds this first act and ils analysis, see
Henrot e (2005) and Henrotte and Poullet
(2005). This act has been published at the
Belgia OfficiaI (Moniteur Belge) (loi du










de surveillance de Phenix serait remettre
en cause l'équilibre des pouvoirs entre
la Commission de la protection de la vie
privée (dépendant du législatif) et l'Ordre
judiciaire, tous deux institutionnellement
et légalement indépendants." (Doc.Parl.
Ch., 2004-2005, ]654/001, p. 42).
See the opinion delivered by the Belgian
Data Protection Authority {Opinion n°
] ]/2004 (Poullet & Moreau, 2006), point
22, pubJished on the Web site of the Belgian
Privacy Commission).
ln that point II, we will analyze only the
question related to the civil procedure. The
additional problems raised by the elec-
troniccriminal procedure aretoo complex
forbeingevokedhere. See Vandermeersch
(2007) about these additional problems.
Art. 4 of the 2006 Act recalling the same
principle a]ready asserted by the art. 4 §I
of the act on electronic signature.
About this fundamental principle, see
Lamberts (2007).
Montero (2007).
"ChaqJJe fois qu'une disposition légale
prévoit la signature d'une pièce de la
procédure et qu'il s'agit d'une pièce
électronique, celle-ci est pourvue d'une
signature qualifiée... Cette signature
électronique qualifiée est assimilée à une
signature électronique... La signature
qualifiée s'entend de la signature élec-
tronique avancée définie à l'article 2,2°
de la loi du 9 juillet 2001 fixant certaines
règles relative aux cadres juridiquespour
les signatures électroniques et les services
de certification, certifié par un certificat
qualifié visé à l'article, 4°, de cette loi et
créé avec un dispositif sécurisé au sens
de l'article 2, 7° de cette loi." (Art. 7 of
the 2006 Act). To be complete, it has to
be underlined that the electronic signature
linked with the use of the electronic identity




.On that point. ee (Poullet and Moreau,
2006)
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decided by the uropean Human Rights
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published nota yin 200]. Rev. Trim des
droits de l'ho e, 200], p. ]37 and ff,
with annotation by O. de Schutter). This
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the EU Directive 95/46 on Data Protection
(OJ., noL.28], 23 ofNov., pp. 31 and ft),
the same princip es are enunciated by art.
6.1 b.
See as regards th s principle, art. 6 c and e
of the EU Directi e 95/46 quoted footnote
8.
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May 24tb, 2006 out "Identification and
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On that opinion, ee the Web site of The
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privacycommissi n.be
By example, one might imagine that a
lawyer defendin a citizen against his
neighbour for vic nit y questions will ac-
cess differentfiles ncluding criminal files
ofthis neighbour i order to argue against
him.
On that point, see Danieli (2006).
Appeals againstth committee's decisions
are foreseen befor the Highest Court of
Justice (Cour de ssation). Once again,
the existence ofthi recourse put into evi-
dence the intent of he Belgian legislatorto
maintain the inde ndence of the judiciary
power by giving t it the last word.
On that point. see the explanation given
by the Ministry 0 Justice: "Par ailleurs,
autoriser la Comm 'ssion de protection de









and bus m ight be used in order to sign any
elec ronic document of the procedure.
Wh t does "not guilty" mean? ls any law-
yer ho participates in the Phenix system
obli edtouseaantivirussystemandifyes
with which quality? On that question, see
Mou enot (2007).
Art. §2 of the 2006 Act.
As it .s foreseen apart from now under the
revis d Art. 713 of the Civil Pr:ocedural
Cod. "le role est créé et conservé d'une
mani re qui rende possible sa consultation
et ga antit sa lisibilité."
So c rtain companies were noting sys-
tema .cally the names of certain litigants
(empl yees suiting their employers, bad
payer, etc.) in order to constitute black
lists. bout this phenomenon, see Burton
and P ullet (2005).
Art. 4 of the 2006 Act.
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Art. 6 of the 2006 Act. "Sans préjudice
de.\" conventions internationales en la
matière, la signification peut avoir lieu par
voie électronique. Elle a lieu à l'adresse
judiciaire électronique par l'intermédiaire
d'un prestataire de service de communica-
tion..."
Art 10 of the 2006 Act. This article fore-
sees a certain number of requirements to
be observed by the communication serv-
ice provider. The compliance with these
requirements is verified in the context of
a licensing procedure quite similar to the
licensing procedure used for the certifica-
tion service providers in case of electronic
signature.
This actormight be considered as a Trusted
Third Party, combining two functions,
that is, the time stamping function and the
evidence of the sending and receipt of the
messages.
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